Karim Sadjadpour | December 29, 2008
SINCE its Islamist revolution of 1979, Iran's hardline leadership has relentlessly painted the US as a racist power bent on oppressing Muslims worldwide.
Nothing punctures this narrative more than the election of an African-American, Barack Obama, who supports dialogue with Iran and whose middle name, Hussein, is that of the central figure in Shia Islam. While the Bush administration's policies often served to unite Iran's disparate political forces against a common threat, Obama could accentuate the country's internal divisions.
Though intolerant conservatives control Iran's Government, moderates and reformists may be resuscitated by Obama's victory. They were swept out of power by hardliners who used the country's jittery sense of security as a pretext to rig elections, stifle dissent and reverse political and social freedoms. But reformists are likely to mount a rigorous challenge to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad when he seeks re-election next June.
Similarly, for Iran's young population, the least anti-American in the Middle East, there is renewed hope for reconciliation with the US, something that seemed impossible during the Bush years. While popular scepticism toward US policies lingers, there remains a widespread recognition among Iranians that their country will never fulfil its potential as long as its relationship with the US remains adversarial.
Domestically, Iranian hardliners recognise that improved ties with the US could catalyse reforms that would undermine the quasi-monopolies they enjoy in view of the country's in isolation.
Among Arab allies such as Hezbollah and Hamas, US-Iranian diplomatic accommodation could mean an end to their chief ideological patron and primary source of funding. For this reason, when and if a serious dialogue commences, the spoilers will likely attempt to torpedo it. They have had a remarkably successful track record of sabotaging any chance of a diplomatic breakthrough.
The tenor of US-Iran relations will depend greatly on 69-year-old Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. He is more powerful than ever, as the country's most important institutions are led by individuals who were either directly appointed by him or are unfailingly loyal to him.
An important task of the Obama administration will be to probe Khamenei's true disposition. Despite public appearances, does he secretly aspire to a more amicable relationship with the US? Or does he believe that enmity toward the US is necessary to retain the legitimacy of the Islamic republic? Could a more moderate approach by the Obama administration beget a more conciliatory response from Khamenei?
Ultimately, our expectations of Obama's ability to influence US-Iran relations should be realistic. The US can and should make clear that it is eager to put aside 30 years of mutual mistrust and hostility and establish a new tone for the relationship.
If and when it becomes evident that hardliners in Iran are the chief impediment to better relations, internal elite and popular opposition could build, and potentially large, unpredictable cleavages could be created within the Iranian political system.
Karim Sadjadpour is an associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
SINCE its Islamist revolution of 1979, Iran's hardline leadership has relentlessly painted the US as a racist power bent on oppressing Muslims worldwide.
Nothing punctures this narrative more than the election of an African-American, Barack Obama, who supports dialogue with Iran and whose middle name, Hussein, is that of the central figure in Shia Islam. While the Bush administration's policies often served to unite Iran's disparate political forces against a common threat, Obama could accentuate the country's internal divisions.
Though intolerant conservatives control Iran's Government, moderates and reformists may be resuscitated by Obama's victory. They were swept out of power by hardliners who used the country's jittery sense of security as a pretext to rig elections, stifle dissent and reverse political and social freedoms. But reformists are likely to mount a rigorous challenge to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad when he seeks re-election next June.
Similarly, for Iran's young population, the least anti-American in the Middle East, there is renewed hope for reconciliation with the US, something that seemed impossible during the Bush years. While popular scepticism toward US policies lingers, there remains a widespread recognition among Iranians that their country will never fulfil its potential as long as its relationship with the US remains adversarial.
Domestically, Iranian hardliners recognise that improved ties with the US could catalyse reforms that would undermine the quasi-monopolies they enjoy in view of the country's in isolation.
Among Arab allies such as Hezbollah and Hamas, US-Iranian diplomatic accommodation could mean an end to their chief ideological patron and primary source of funding. For this reason, when and if a serious dialogue commences, the spoilers will likely attempt to torpedo it. They have had a remarkably successful track record of sabotaging any chance of a diplomatic breakthrough.
The tenor of US-Iran relations will depend greatly on 69-year-old Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. He is more powerful than ever, as the country's most important institutions are led by individuals who were either directly appointed by him or are unfailingly loyal to him.
An important task of the Obama administration will be to probe Khamenei's true disposition. Despite public appearances, does he secretly aspire to a more amicable relationship with the US? Or does he believe that enmity toward the US is necessary to retain the legitimacy of the Islamic republic? Could a more moderate approach by the Obama administration beget a more conciliatory response from Khamenei?
Ultimately, our expectations of Obama's ability to influence US-Iran relations should be realistic. The US can and should make clear that it is eager to put aside 30 years of mutual mistrust and hostility and establish a new tone for the relationship.
If and when it becomes evident that hardliners in Iran are the chief impediment to better relations, internal elite and popular opposition could build, and potentially large, unpredictable cleavages could be created within the Iranian political system.
Karim Sadjadpour is an associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Source: The Australian
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