By Shiraz Maher
The revised counterterrorism strategy that the British government launched last week is confusing and contradictory. With deft sleight of hand, the dense document popularly known as "Contest 2" appears to give with one hand what it takes away with the other.
At first glance, there is much to celebrate in the revised strategy document. For the first time, the founder of Pakistan's Jamaat-e Islami movement, Abul Ala Maududi, and the Egyptian godfather of modern jihad whom he inspired, Sayyid Qutb, are both named as significant "Islamist thinkers." This sends a symbolic message to their followers that the government considers them part of the problem.
There is now also official acceptance that ideology plays a role in motivating and radicalizing terrorists. Previous government documents considered only sociological factors such as racism, discrimination and lack of social mobility. The current shift is an important first step in overcoming the ideological Stockholm syndrome that has traditionally dominated official British thinking on these matters.
But much of this is a false dawn. In essence, Contest 2 is the continuation of a failed policy.
The British state has traditionally predicated its policy on the premise that ostensibly nonviolent Islamists can be part of the solution to al Qaeda violence. Those who invested their hopes in such a strategy believed that only radical Islamist preachers possessed the "street cred" needed to dissuade young men from the path of violence. It was as if the cure lay within the poison itself.
The practical effect of this has been to engage and empower nonviolent exponents of Islamism who, while expressing opposition to the terrorism of Osama bin Laden and his cohorts, hold values and views that are antithetical to mainstream British society. This has often meant turning a blind eye to preachers who advocate the killing of homosexuals, the oppression of women and the subjugation of nonbelievers.
This tendency is exemplified by the term "Preventing Violent Extremism," the banner under which the government's flagship counterterrorism strategy continues to operate.
As the name suggests, a premium is placed on ensuring that there is no violence on British shores. The manner in which this objective is achieved has been deemed to be of little or no importance. The result is that Islamists have routinely been enlisted as official, public partners in the hope that their cooperation might reduce the terrorist threat.
Of course, such a strategy might deliver short-term results, making it all the more appealing to those whose primary concern is security. Yet on whose terms are such pacts negotiated? And is it right that liberal societies should endorse those whose values we would otherwise find abhorrent?
Knowing where to draw the line is crucial, and the issue of strategic engagement with partners must be at the heart of any program that hopes to realize its aims.
However, Contest 2 continues to focus on violent extremism without considering the wider Islamist infrastructure that inspires and motivates terrorism. In practical terms, this means that Contest 2 is largely a continuation of the policy that preceded it, rather than representing a break with the past. The government is still unwilling to shift the focus of its efforts from preventing violent extremism to preventing all extremism.
This much was confirmed by a senior official in the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism who circulated a private letter, which I have seen, to Muslim groups after the revised strategy was revealed. "Any suggestion that we intend to criminalise people who reject our values but operate within the existing law is wrong. Nor will such people be the targets of our counter-terrorist strategy, which is concerned with violent extremism."
He revealed the strategy is "largely the same as was published last June [2008] in the cross-government Prevent strategy that you will be familiar with." It is an extraordinary revelation given the fanfare with which the government launched Contest 2.
Therefore, when government now talks about ideology, it does so in only the narrowest possible terms: the bloodcurdling doctrine of al Qaeda. By refusing to cast the net further, groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and its sprawling network of "front groups" continue unchallenged. Yet the Brotherhood is a movement whose views, including its desire to establish a pan-Islamic theocracy, are fundamentally irreconcilable with those of a liberal society.
In recent months the government has taken a strong line against those who have either directly condoned or been apologists for terrorism. For example, the Home Office banned Ibrahim Moussawi from visiting the U.K. last month because he is a spokesman for Hezbollah.
More recently, the secretary of state for communities, Hazel Blears, suspended links with the Muslim Council of Britain. Its deputy secretary general, Daud Abdullah, attended in February an Islamist conference in Istanbul where he signed a "statement" addressed to "all rulers and peoples concerning events in Gaza."
The statement issued a number of "legal judgements" which included: "The obligation of the Islamic nation to regard the sending of foreign warships into Muslim waters, claiming to control the borders and prevent the smuggling of arms to Gaza, as a declaration of war, a new occupation, sinful aggression, and a clear violation of the sovereignty of the nation. This must be rejected and fought by all means and ways."
This was intended as a thinly veiled threat against Britain's Royal Navy, which offered to send warships to the Mediterranean as part of an international peacekeeping force during the Gaza war. Mr. Abdullah, who was also involved in the Muslim Council of Britain's boycott of Holocaust Memorial Day, has tried -- and failed -- to explain away his comments ever since.
These incidents only registered on the government's radar because of their link to violence. Meanwhile, Islamist pressure groups such as the Muslim Association of Britain continue to play a central role in crucial initiatives such as the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board, a body created after the 7/7 terrorist attacks in London to regulate British mosques.
The government's unwillingness to consider its engagement strategy has created this problem. Who should its partners be? Who are the real bulwarks against radicalization and who are the bogus ones? And by what criteria should those partners be chosen?
For starters, the state should draw a line against any group or individual opposed to those inalienable and nonnegotiable values -- such as not discriminating on the basis of religion, race, sexual orientation or gender -- which define the British public sphere in the 21st century.
These values are universal and applicable to all communities. Government should use them to create a robust, values-led initiative that makes clear exactly what the state stands for.
Contest 2 is a most necessary strategy for combating the threat to British society. But if the government continues to embrace reactionary Islamists indiscriminately, it risks discrediting the entire enterprise.
Mr. Maher is a senior research fellow at Policy Exchange in London, which just released his pamphlet "Choosing Our Friends Wisely: Criteria for Engagement With Muslim Groups."
The revised counterterrorism strategy that the British government launched last week is confusing and contradictory. With deft sleight of hand, the dense document popularly known as "Contest 2" appears to give with one hand what it takes away with the other.
At first glance, there is much to celebrate in the revised strategy document. For the first time, the founder of Pakistan's Jamaat-e Islami movement, Abul Ala Maududi, and the Egyptian godfather of modern jihad whom he inspired, Sayyid Qutb, are both named as significant "Islamist thinkers." This sends a symbolic message to their followers that the government considers them part of the problem.
There is now also official acceptance that ideology plays a role in motivating and radicalizing terrorists. Previous government documents considered only sociological factors such as racism, discrimination and lack of social mobility. The current shift is an important first step in overcoming the ideological Stockholm syndrome that has traditionally dominated official British thinking on these matters.
But much of this is a false dawn. In essence, Contest 2 is the continuation of a failed policy.
The British state has traditionally predicated its policy on the premise that ostensibly nonviolent Islamists can be part of the solution to al Qaeda violence. Those who invested their hopes in such a strategy believed that only radical Islamist preachers possessed the "street cred" needed to dissuade young men from the path of violence. It was as if the cure lay within the poison itself.
The practical effect of this has been to engage and empower nonviolent exponents of Islamism who, while expressing opposition to the terrorism of Osama bin Laden and his cohorts, hold values and views that are antithetical to mainstream British society. This has often meant turning a blind eye to preachers who advocate the killing of homosexuals, the oppression of women and the subjugation of nonbelievers.
This tendency is exemplified by the term "Preventing Violent Extremism," the banner under which the government's flagship counterterrorism strategy continues to operate.
As the name suggests, a premium is placed on ensuring that there is no violence on British shores. The manner in which this objective is achieved has been deemed to be of little or no importance. The result is that Islamists have routinely been enlisted as official, public partners in the hope that their cooperation might reduce the terrorist threat.
Of course, such a strategy might deliver short-term results, making it all the more appealing to those whose primary concern is security. Yet on whose terms are such pacts negotiated? And is it right that liberal societies should endorse those whose values we would otherwise find abhorrent?
Knowing where to draw the line is crucial, and the issue of strategic engagement with partners must be at the heart of any program that hopes to realize its aims.
However, Contest 2 continues to focus on violent extremism without considering the wider Islamist infrastructure that inspires and motivates terrorism. In practical terms, this means that Contest 2 is largely a continuation of the policy that preceded it, rather than representing a break with the past. The government is still unwilling to shift the focus of its efforts from preventing violent extremism to preventing all extremism.
This much was confirmed by a senior official in the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism who circulated a private letter, which I have seen, to Muslim groups after the revised strategy was revealed. "Any suggestion that we intend to criminalise people who reject our values but operate within the existing law is wrong. Nor will such people be the targets of our counter-terrorist strategy, which is concerned with violent extremism."
He revealed the strategy is "largely the same as was published last June [2008] in the cross-government Prevent strategy that you will be familiar with." It is an extraordinary revelation given the fanfare with which the government launched Contest 2.
Therefore, when government now talks about ideology, it does so in only the narrowest possible terms: the bloodcurdling doctrine of al Qaeda. By refusing to cast the net further, groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and its sprawling network of "front groups" continue unchallenged. Yet the Brotherhood is a movement whose views, including its desire to establish a pan-Islamic theocracy, are fundamentally irreconcilable with those of a liberal society.
In recent months the government has taken a strong line against those who have either directly condoned or been apologists for terrorism. For example, the Home Office banned Ibrahim Moussawi from visiting the U.K. last month because he is a spokesman for Hezbollah.
More recently, the secretary of state for communities, Hazel Blears, suspended links with the Muslim Council of Britain. Its deputy secretary general, Daud Abdullah, attended in February an Islamist conference in Istanbul where he signed a "statement" addressed to "all rulers and peoples concerning events in Gaza."
The statement issued a number of "legal judgements" which included: "The obligation of the Islamic nation to regard the sending of foreign warships into Muslim waters, claiming to control the borders and prevent the smuggling of arms to Gaza, as a declaration of war, a new occupation, sinful aggression, and a clear violation of the sovereignty of the nation. This must be rejected and fought by all means and ways."
This was intended as a thinly veiled threat against Britain's Royal Navy, which offered to send warships to the Mediterranean as part of an international peacekeeping force during the Gaza war. Mr. Abdullah, who was also involved in the Muslim Council of Britain's boycott of Holocaust Memorial Day, has tried -- and failed -- to explain away his comments ever since.
These incidents only registered on the government's radar because of their link to violence. Meanwhile, Islamist pressure groups such as the Muslim Association of Britain continue to play a central role in crucial initiatives such as the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board, a body created after the 7/7 terrorist attacks in London to regulate British mosques.
The government's unwillingness to consider its engagement strategy has created this problem. Who should its partners be? Who are the real bulwarks against radicalization and who are the bogus ones? And by what criteria should those partners be chosen?
For starters, the state should draw a line against any group or individual opposed to those inalienable and nonnegotiable values -- such as not discriminating on the basis of religion, race, sexual orientation or gender -- which define the British public sphere in the 21st century.
These values are universal and applicable to all communities. Government should use them to create a robust, values-led initiative that makes clear exactly what the state stands for.
Contest 2 is a most necessary strategy for combating the threat to British society. But if the government continues to embrace reactionary Islamists indiscriminately, it risks discrediting the entire enterprise.
Mr. Maher is a senior research fellow at Policy Exchange in London, which just released his pamphlet "Choosing Our Friends Wisely: Criteria for Engagement With Muslim Groups."
Source: Wall Street Journal
H/T: Europe News
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